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In preparing for and responding to natural hazards and disasters, the welfare state establishes 
a social contract, distributing responsibilities for what will be collectively managed and what 
will be individually borne. Drawing on archival, interview, and ethnographic data, this article 
examines the renegotiation of that social contract through the lens of contested efforts to 
reform the massively indebted US National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) from 2011 to 
2014. In the face of a morally charged debate about deservingness and individual choice, 
Congress passed legislation that committed to incorporating need-based considerations to the 
NFIP for the first time. The result defined “deservingness” in terms of ability to pay for risk 
exposure, qualifying an individualization of responsibility for addressing the problem of 
flood loss—a problem that might instead demand broader risk sharing, particularly as climate 
change worsens the threat of flooding. 
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Through governance of natural hazards and disasters, states play a central role in keeping 
people safe and in helping them recover economically in the event of catastrophe. In doing 
so, they establish a kind of social contract, determining what will be collectively managed 
and what will be individually borne. How that balance is struck depends, in part, on the 
relative strength of moral claims for solidarity from fellow citizens and taxpayers. In this 
article, I examine the renegotiation of that social contract through the lens of contested efforts 
to reform the US National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) from 2011 to 2014. In the face of 
massive debt the program incurred after Hurricane Katrina, reformers easily won a 
technocratic fix that would enhance individual responsibility, premised on moral claims 
about deservingness and individual choice. However, less than two years later, following 
Hurricane Sandy and backlash from affected policyholders, Congress abandoned some of the 
changes with new legislation that committed to incorporating need-based considerations to 
the NFIP for the first time. Drawing on archival, interview, and ethnographic data, I trace the 
morally charged debate. I argue that the result defined “deservingness” around ability to pay 
for risk exposure, qualifying an individualization of responsibility for addressing the problem 
of flood loss—a problem that might instead demand broader risk sharing, particularly as 
climate change worsens the threat of flooding.  
In the sections that follow, I begin by situating the case in a theoretical tradition in 
welfare state scholarship that typically excludes this policy domain—natural hazards and 
disasters—from its view. As in social policy debates more generally, NFIP stakeholders 
articulated and disputed claims about deservingness and choice to justify rival visions of the 
fair terms of social interdependence in flood insurance. After describing the methodology and 
evidence, I turn to the history of the NFIP. I show how its design and implementation created 
space for these rival visions through the incorporation of individualistic and solidaristic 
elements in the program. I then tell the story of NFIP reform in three acts, following the 
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advocacy that led to reform, the backlash to reform, and the “reform of the reform” that was 
ultimately passed. In the discussion, I analyze how the emergent definition of deservingness 
reorganized the arrangement of federal assistance and individual responsibility, forging a 
tentative resolution to the competing demands made on the NFIP. I conclude with the 
implications of these changes, and the arguments that produced them, for the question of how 
states and citizens adapt to a future defined by climate change. 
The Moral Economy of American Natural Hazards and Disaster Policy  
Political sociologists and political scientists have connected the scope and generosity of 
social policy to the articulation and mobilization of “categories of worth,” particularly 
whether policymakers and the public perceive recipients as “deserving” or “undeserving.” 
Such distinctions serve discursively to justify the balance of individual and collective 
obligations and to institutionalize programmatic boundaries between categories of 
beneficiaries.1 In the United States, this normative distinction has been especially powerful.2 
The deserving are generally believed not to be to blame for the adversity they face, whereas 
the undeserving are often narrated in policy debates as those who have made poor choices; 
they are in some way personally responsible for their own troubles. Claims of deservingness 
thus implicate judgments about the existence and meaningfulness of individual choice. This 
implication has been apparent in the last several decades of American social policymaking, 
where “deservingness” has not always been explicitly invoked by political elites.3 Instead, 
arguments for cutting back on spending, adding requirements, or reducing eligibility have 
been premised on ideas about choice, not only as a way of attributing blame (i.e., past choices 
create present suffering), but also as a strategy of governing. Policymakers seek to manage 
the choices of beneficiaries, scrutinizing the “perverse incentives” that disincline the target 
population from taking personal responsibility and that keep them dependent. These 
arguments and strategies address the welfare state’s “moral hazard” problem: that rational 
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individuals will, if protected from the consequences of their actions by social insurance or 
other policies, make irresponsible choices to their own detriment and that of the collective. 
According to this particular logic about how policies affect behavior, it is more efficient, fair, 
and even more compassionate to foster self-reliance and personal responsibility—and to limit 
collective obligations on that basis.4   
 This article examines contestation surrounding deservingness and choice in natural 
hazards and disaster policy, a domain in which questions of moral economy warrant greater 
attention. Though not conventionally considered to fall under the umbrella of American 
social protection (and neglected in welfare state scholarship for that reason), natural hazards 
and disaster policy commits federal expenditures to respond to those in need. Policymakers 
may not design such policy as a form of antipoverty welfare, but it nevertheless shares risk 
and compensates individuals for loss and suffering.5 Framed this way, extending an analysis 
of moral claims about deservingness and choice to this policy domain can help explain 
designations of how much, or what kinds of, responsibility individuals and local communities 
are expected to assume to protect themselves.  
 As in the context of social policy, money is the driver of contests over the designation 
of deservingness and the meaning of choice in natural hazards and disaster policy. In the 
United States, the ability to represent loss after a catastrophe as blameless enhances claims 
for federal resources.6 Blamelessness, in turn, has historically corresponded to the treatment 
of natural disasters as “acts of God,” whether literally or figuratively understood: unfortunate 
events that can be neither foreseen nor prevented.7 Those afflicted by them are thus blameless 
victims, facing misfortune that might befall anyone, even those who had made the “right” 
choices. Policymakers and the public have therefore treated measures to socialize the risks of 
natural disasters as “legitimate exceptions to the usual liberal insistence on individual 
responsibility.”8 Flood insurance was one such measure, established by Congress in the late 
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1960s to provide coverage for a previously uninsurable risk. Yet flood insurance at the same 
time transformed floods “into a different kind of event”: not acts of God, but scientifically 
foreseeable, patterned events that can ostensibly be planned for by individuals on the basis of 
probabilistic risk assessment.9 Developments in natural hazards risk science made it possible 
to assess and assign risk levels and costs even to the individual property. As a condition of 
socializing the risk, flood insurance created new individual responsibilities. Individuals 
would now have to account for and manage the costs of living in a floodplain.  
With the establishment of the NFIP, the federal government forged a new kind of 
social interdependence in the face of this particular natural disaster. With the design and 
implementation of its technical features, it sets the terms of that social interdependence: who 
pays how much and for whose security, what kinds of conditions accompany access to 
coverage, and the incentives to which insureds are expected to respond. This recasts 
questions of deservingness and choice related to natural hazards and disasters. Who deserves 
help, and what kind, if natural hazard risks can be individually assessed and foreseen? Are 
individuals to blame for their vulnerability to natural disasters? How should flood insurance 
manage the incentives and choices of the insured? When the NFIP faced financial crisis, 
stakeholders debated these questions of deservingness and choice in pursuit of divergent 
visions for how the terms of social interdependence should be reset: the particular ways in 
which flood insurance should individualize or socialize flood risk. As in the case of social 
policy, the distinctions that emerged from this debate, discursively and institutionally, 
reorganize arrangements for managing the costs of living with uncertain and changing risks.  
Methodological Approach and Evidence 
Insurance is, by its nature, a mechanism for socializing risk. However, it can do that to a 
greater or lesser extent.10 The technical characteristics of programs and policies include and 
exclude, forge communities of fate, and assign obligations to members.11 In this article, I 
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examine the claims made by participants in flood insurance reform to justify and oppose 
proposed changes to such technical characteristics. I offer a “close reading” of these events, 
based on data from a multisited, mixed methods study of the crisis facing the NFIP. My 
analysis relies on congressional and federal agency archives and transcripts (1967–73 and 
2011–14); eleven interviews12 with government officials, environmentalists, insurance 
industry professionals, flood risk modelers and engineers, think tank representatives, and 
homeowner activists who participated in flood insurance reform; and ethnographic 
observation in New York City and Washington, DC (from October 2013 to November 2014), 
at sites in which flood insurance reform was discussed, implemented, or debated, including 
public meetings of a National Academy of Sciences study committee, meetings and 
conference calls with homeowner activist groups, and academic events on flood insurance 
reform. I also reviewed legislation, scientific reports on flood risk assessment and mapping, 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) reports, insurance industry reports and presentation materials regarding flood risk, 
and news media accounts of the flood insurance reform process. By combining fieldwork 
with information and accounts in relevant documents, I strove for an abundance of data about 
how these reforms unfolded. 
The overall approach provides a “policy-focused” analysis that treats policy as a 
terrain of struggle as well as the prize of political action. In outlining this approach, Hacker 
and Pierson observe that the stuff of modern politics is often about “reshaping governance in 
enduring ways” via public policy changes, rather than gaining office. This shifts our 
analytical gaze from elections to those policies.13 Applied to this case, flood insurance policy 
provides both the terrain for competing claims about the efficient and fair terms of social 
interdependence and the prize that various interests and groups pursued through the 
promulgation of moral claims. 
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The History of the NFIP 
To contextualize the post-Katrina financial crisis facing the NFIP and the debate that ensued, 
we need to examine how the terms of social interdependence in the face of flood risk were 
initially established and how they broke down. In the history of the NFIP’s origins and 
implementation, these terms have been connected to the set of public policy objectives that 
policymakers hoped to achieve with a public flood insurance program. In practice, they 
yielded a flood insurance program that encompassed elements of both a more individualistic 
private insurance program and a more solidaristic social insurance program. When the 
program appeared in need of major reform, stakeholders prioritized these elements 
differently, mobilizing claims about deservingness and choice to make competing demands 
on the program.  
Congress established the NFIP in 1968 as a new mechanism for managing and 
distributing the rising costs of flood losses. Federal flood risk management had previously 
combined structural flood protection (e.g.,  the funding of walls, dams, levees) and subsidized 
loans or disaster relief following catastrophe—a combination that was a growing and 
unpredictable drain on public resources by the 1950s. Structural flood protection had made 
flood-prone areas appear unduly safe for development and habitation, encouraging more 
people to move in and putting more property at risk of loss when structures failed (a dynamic 
referred to as the “levee effect”).14 According to a 1966 study commissioned by Congress 
from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), public flood insurance, 
premised on scientific developments that made catastrophic risk assessment possible, would 
achieve several public policy goals simultaneously. First, it would stem growing relief costs 
by having people prefund at least a portion of their own recovery through the payment of 
premiums, decreasing burdens on taxpayers. Second, actuarial premiums, that is, rates based 
on assessments of flood risk, would create “much stronger” price incentives that individuals 
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would incorporate into rational decisions about whether to buy or build in a flood zone.15 
Individual policyholders, rather than the federal government, would thus bear personal 
responsibility for managing the costs of living in the floodplain. In doing so, they would 
enhance collective flood security through their own individual calculations, which would 
presumably lead them away from the riskiest and most uneconomical uses of the floodplain. 
Under an actuarial system, the problem of flood, transformed into risk, could now be 
governed through the calculating actions of individuals on behalf of themselves and their 
families.16 The outlines of the NFIP codified expectations regarding individual choice, 
dependent on the availability of scientific risk assessment that would produce both 
information and incentives.  
Yet even with the creation of these new individual responsibilities, policymakers in 
the 1960s narrated flood insurance as coherent with the way the federal government 
socialized other risks through insurance: flood insurance would extend financial security to 
homeowners who previously had gone without. The private insurance market had long 
declined to underwrite flood risk, leaving flood victims at the mercy of politically capricious 
relief.  The situation provided “neither security nor dignity,” in the words of Representative 
Carl Albert during 1967 congressional debates about initiating a flood insurance program.17 
With the establishment of such a program, the federal government would in a single act 
transform flood from uninsurable to insurable risk, protecting property owners by spreading 
flood risks nationwide and providing more reliable compensation.18 For people already living 
in flood-prone areas, who had lacked risk information on which to make an informed and 
economical choice, actuarial rates could be unaffordable. In congressional debates to 
authorize the NFIP, policymakers insisted that premiums needed to be “reasonable,” as a 
matter of fairness.19 They did not want to penalize homeowners for choices made before 
floodplains were mapped. The NFIP thus put in place subsidies that would allow such 
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floodplain occupants to access protection at lower, “reasonable,” rates.20 Members of 
Congress also expressed a desire for rates to be reasonable more generally to encourage 
participation and broaden the accessibility of what was, at its launch in 1969, a voluntary 
program of insurance. As a condition of accessing the protection offered by the NFIP, 
communities would also have to accept some collective responsibility by adopting a set of 
land use and building code regulations. In the broader context of natural hazards and disaster 
policy, flood insurance was never meant to replace, but to be “carefully interrelated with,” 
other various responses to floods, including flood protection works and disaster relief. The 
1966 HUD described the relationship between these responses as “complementary, not 
competitive, with each strengthening the other to promote the national welfare.”21 
 The NFIP, under HUD before being transferred to FEMA in 1979, would rate 
insurance for individual properties based on “flood insurance rate maps,” which graft onto 
the landscape official flood zones and expected flood elevations. In 1973, after the NFIP 
showed sluggish growth in its first few years, Congress made flood insurance compulsory for 
all property owners with federally backed mortgages in high-risk flood zones (areas 
determined to be subject to flooding by the 1-percent-annual-chance flood event or the “100-
year floodplain”).22 The program also put in place a grandfathering provision that allowed 
homeowners to hold onto previous (lower) rates if, when risk maps were updated (as they 
were mandated to be for the sake of accuracy), they were shown to be at greater risk. With 
subsidies and grandfathering in place, in practice Congress and the NFIP did not commit to 
implementing fully the actuarial calculus of choice, targeting instead an objective of broader 
risk sharing through “reasonable,” that is, affordable, rates. The NFIP emulated a more 
individualistic private insurance institution in classifying risk and assigning individual 
contributions on that basis. In decoupling some premium levels from risk, providing 
guaranteed coverage (such that no flood risk is too bad to insure, even for properties that 
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repeatedly flood), and, after 1973, mandating coverage, the NFIP resembled a more 
solidaristic social insurance program. From its early years, the NFIP was meant to be both 
actuarial and affordable, risk-based and broadly accessible: objectives that were not 
necessarily compatible and that created space for competing demands when the program 
reached a crisis point.  
 Even with the NFIP in place, development of flood prone areas proceeded apace. The 
program struggled to enforce land use restrictions as a condition of enrolling communities in 
the program, which was growing so quickly in the 1970s that it could not keep up with the 
need for new and updated maps to communicate and price risk. The population in coastal 
shoreline counties, where densities are six times greater than in inland counties, has grown 
almost 40 percent since 1970.23 More than 120 million Americans live in counties that border 
the open ocean or Great Lakes or include a 100-year coastal floodplain.24 According to 2009 
estimates, 10 percent of the population resides in an official high-risk flood zone.25 In short, 
many more people live near the water, but only a relatively small percentage are “officially” 
at-risk and subject to the mandatory purchase requirement. That requirement has also been 
inconsistently enforced over the years. Because of gaps in FEMA’s data, estimates of 
insurance take-up vary, but a 2006 RAND report suggested that about 49 percent of single-
family homes in high-risk flood zones are covered by flood insurance. This further narrows 
the risk pool and leads to billions of dollars in uninsured property losses, some of which may 
be compensated by disaster relief.26  
At the program’s outset, policymakers recognized that continued subsidization of 
insurance could encourage rather than discourage floodplain habitation, contravening a major 
goal of the program. They expected there would be “natural attrition” of subsidized policies 
from the NFIP, as properties flooded and presumably would not be rebuilt. Yet as of 2011, 
about 20 percent of the NFIP’s 5.6 million policyholders still carried subsidized rates and 
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“severe repetitive loss” properties that have filed numerous expensive claims are a major 
issue for the program.27 FEMA does not know how many properties are currently paying 
grandfathered rates.28 Nevertheless, despite the subsidies and grandfathering, which lowered 
the total amount of premiums relative to the assessed risk, the NFIP was financially 
functional for several decades.29 Then in 2005 Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, 
overwhelming the claims capacity of the NFIP and plunging it into over $16 billion of debt to 
the US Treasury. In 2006, the GAO put the NFIP on its High Risk List of government 
operations that pose significant fiscal threats to the state. Hit soon after by the Midwest 
floods of 2008, the program owed $18 billion that it seemingly could not repay.30 The NFIP’s 
financial crisis after Katrina laid open a conflict between the actuarial promises of the NFIP 
and measures that kept had rates “reasonable,” that is, affordable, for many policyholders. In 
the 2011–14 reform controversy, examined in the next section, stakeholders advanced claims 
about deservingness and choice in order to prioritize actuarialism or affordability in the future 
of the NFIP.  
NFIP Reform in Three Acts 
The reform at the heart of the controversy examined here, the Biggert-Waters Flood 
Insurance Reform Act (henceforth “Biggert-Waters”), became law in July 2012 with 
overwhelming bipartisan support from an otherwise highly polarized Congress. Biggert-
Waters was the most comprehensive reform of the NFIP since its establishment, intended to 
make the program “actuarially sound,” namely, to restructure the program to bring in enough 
in premiums to cover the risk. The key provisions of Biggert-Waters (a) eliminated premium 
discounts (from subsidies and grandfathering) and imposed new actuarial rates, programwide, 
that reflected the individual’s “true cost” of risk coverage, and (b) recommitted resources to 
fund flood risk studies and maps for the sake of providing up-to-date and accurate scientific 
risk assessments and risk-based insurance rates. The legislation also toughened the penalties 
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on lenders who fail to enforce the mandatory insurance purchase requirement; mandated that 
FEMA study the effectiveness of building codes and made grants available for building code 
enforcement; and mandated that FEMA study the affordability of actuarial rates—but did not 
indicate that this study should come before FEMA increased rates as it implemented the rest 
of the law. 
In the sections that follow, I tell the story of Biggert-Waters and the backlash that 
followed in three acts. Supporters and opponents of Biggert-Waters alike cited the NFIP’s 
failures but disagreed about what constituted a fair and effective path forward. The first act 
traces the successful efforts of reformers to pass Biggert-Waters: a technocratic fix that 
reaffirmed the actuarial commitments of flood insurance. The reformers articulated 
arguments about the choice-sensitivity of exposure to flood risk, and what floodplain 
residents versus taxpayers therefore deserved. The second act chronicles the backlash to 
Biggert-Waters, led by a group of activist homeowners who subjected the choice-sensitivity 
of flood risk to scrutiny, highlighting implementation failures and economic pressures that 
contributed to a collectively produced crisis facing the NFIP. Having complicated the 
argument about choice—whether or for what homeowners were to blame—the debate about 
what homeowners deserved became a matter of who would be affected and what they could 
afford. The third act discusses the “reform of the reform” that was ultimately passed in 
response to the controversy. The new legislation maintained a bipartisan commitment to 
informed choice as a basis for governing flood risk, but qualified the individualization of 
responsibility, preserving continued federal support for those who could be determined truly 
to need it.  
Act I: Choice and Deservingness in Biggert-Waters  
Much of the energy behind Biggert-Waters came from an unlikely coalition of 
environmentalists31 and conservative, libertarian, and taxpayer groups32 called SmarterSafer. 
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In its advocacy, SmarterSafer defined NFIP reform as a matter of technical adjustments that 
would have individuals pay risk-based rates for their own expected losses, for moral, 
economic, and environmental reasons. Living in a risky floodplain was an individual choice 
and, as a matter of fairness, low-risk policyholders and taxpayers should not be forced to 
support high-risk policyholders financially for the expensive consequences of their choices. 
From an economic standpoint, the NFIP needed to make an actuarial shift to bring in enough 
premiums to meet expected losses and to inform better choices going forward (i.e., reduce 
future flood losses through individual risk mitigation measures or relocation). Risk-based 
rates would also yield environmental protection, acting as a control over real estate 
development in hazardous natural terrains.33 In essence, SmarterSafer asked Congress to 
make the NFIP do in practice what it promised to do on paper in 1968: reduce flood losses 
through signaling risk in actuarial premiums. By 2011, SmarterSafer had begun working 
closely with the House Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing, and Community Opportunity to 
draft what became Biggert-Waters, named for the then-subcommittee chair, Rep. Judy 
Biggert (R-IL) and ranking member Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA).34 Insurance industry 
interests also supported the reform.35 Private insurance companies administer the NFIP; they 
do not bear the risk, but receive a commission (about 30 percent of the policy) for servicing 
policies and managing claims.  
In March 2011 Congressional hearings on legislative proposals to reform the NFIP, 
witnesses (including SmarterSafer members) and members of Congress connected the 
apparent impossibility of NFIP debt repayment to “the persistence of federally subsidized 
premiums,” in the words of Rep. Robert J. Dold (R-IL).36 Keeping these subsidies was also, 
in the words of a witness from the Association of State Flood Plain Managers (ASFPM), 
“help[ing] people ignore their risk,” by not sending a clear signal through risk-based 
insurance prices. Instead, the NFIP should “enable market-based financial decisions.” The 
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ASFPM witness went on: “It is very important that the people who are living at risk, know 
the risk and share the—and be part of paying for their risk. It is, we feel, inappropriate to 
externalize that risk to the rest of the taxpayers, the Federal taxpayers.”37 This was 
particularly true in the case of severe repetitive loss properties. The chairwoman of the 
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC) testified: “Quite simply, 
American taxpayers should not be forced to subsidize a small subset of NFIP policyholders 
who continue to rebuild in high-risk areas.”38 This was, she later stated,  
simply not fair to the American taxpayer. There are folks who wish to [rebuild]. If 
they wish to rebuild in these areas, they need to be charged actuarially sound rates. If 
they want to absorb that risk, they need to pay for that risk. They need to pay for it, 
not the American taxpayer.39  
 
A representative from Taxpayers for Common Sense (a member of SmarterSafer) testified 
about the importance of homeowners’ engaging in some “decision-making to deal with about 
where their home is, or mitigation measures they could take that would reduce the cost or 
reduce their vulnerability.” The issue was, in his words, about “trying to remove that risk off 
the back of the taxpayer and putting it back on to the policyholders where it logically 
belongs.”40 In written testimony, added to the official record, Taxpayers for Common Sense 
argued, “taxpayers deserve to have those who choose to live in harm’s way pick up their 
share of the tab.”41 In May 2012 Senate hearings on NFIP reauthorization, a Montana 
floodplain administrator testified: 
The American taxpayer is increasingly unwilling to provide financial support for 
those who have time and time again received handouts post-flood who then do 
absolutely nothing to prevent future damages as they know Uncle Sam will be there 
check in hand to quite literally bail them out again. 42 
 
Neither were taxpayers willing to support irresponsible NFIP policyholders: “Gone, too, are 
the days that the taxpayer will support those who knowingly choose to live in areas and in 
homes with severe flood risk.” In the same Senate hearing, a representative from the 
Heartland Institute (a libertarian think tank) submitted a statement urging that “The federal 
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government should not encourage the choice to live in harm’s way” through below-risk 
insurance rating and outdated flood risk assessments and maps.43 Experts at these hearings 
were asked to address how an actuarial shift would affect low- and middle-income 
policyholders. They suggested voucher programs, like those administered by HUD for 
housing, or separate appropriations for supplementing insurance payments. 
 Taken together, these reformers sought to motivate policy change by emphasizing the 
knowability of flood risk, which carried with it obligations surrounding individual choice and 
what flood zone policyholders thus deserved vis–à–vis taxpayers. Floods were not calamities 
that hit people unaware; they had long been scientifically assessed risks, visualized on maps. 
The availability of risk information made flood risk choice-sensitive: policyholders put 
themselves at risk when they chose to buy or build in the flood zones and were therefore not 
blameless in the event of a loss. The assignment of risk-based cost at the individual level 
worked against a sense of shared vulnerability, bolstering the argument that taxpayers who 
had made the choice not to expose themselves to flood risk ought not be made to pay for the 
risks of others. A reformed NFIP would not only enhance fairness based on prior choices, but 
also enact a more sensible risk-based calculus of choice going forward—one that had long 
been promised, but not delivered because of subsidization and grandfathering. The prudent 
future role of the NFIP was not to provide support in the form of subsidized insurance; that 
was feeding an ongoing moral hazard that invited development in the floodplains. Rather, 
echoing arguments in other arenas of policymaking, individuals needed information—
visualized on maps and transformed into a price signal—that would allow them to make the 
best choices. Reform needed to involve some restructuring of the incentives of the insured, 
with the individual taking more responsibility for exposure to and for managing his/her risk.  
The Biggert-Waters bill won bipartisan enthusiasm, passed both houses of Congress, 
and was signed by the president. Under the law, subsidized policyholders would see a 25 
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percent increase each year until premiums reflected the “full risk” rate. The end of 
grandfathering would affect all policyholders when their maps were updated. Properties that 
had been intentionally built outside the flood zones could find themselves “mapped in” and 
subject to flood insurance purchase requirements for the first time—at actuarial rates. Or, if 
new maps showed that a property was now at higher risk, the policyholder would not be able 
to retain his or her earlier (lower) rate. FEMA began implementing the law without 
completing the affordability study.  
Act II: Backlash to Biggert-Waters: Disputed Choice and Deservingness  
Just three months after Biggert-Waters was signed into law, its implementation was tested: 
Hurricane Sandy devastated coastal New York and New Jersey (the storm also added another 
$6 billion to the NFIP’s debt). FEMA had been updating the map for the region when the 
storm hit. Wanting homeowners to rebuild with information about the new landscape of risk 
and what it would cost under Biggert-Waters, FEMA disseminated the “best available” 
versions of what the new maps would look like. In the winter of 2013, after learning he was 
to be remapped into a higher risk zone and being quoted an actuarial rate of $30,000 per year, 
Toms River, New Jersey, resident George Kasimos started “Stop FEMA Now,” a network of 
floodplain homeowners, specifically to protest Biggert-Waters.44 The group—later called a 
“grass-roots political juggernaut” in the pages of the Wall Street Journal—grew quickly 
through social media, with chapters forming first in Sandy-affected New York City, and later 
in coastal and riverine communities nationwide.45 Homeowners on the political right and left 
joined in, united in the goal of staving off the financial shocks from increased premiums 
under Biggert-Waters. Stop FEMA Now also gained powerful allies in the National 
Association of Realtors, the National Association of Home Builders, the American Bankers 
Association, and the US Chamber of Commerce, who viewed flood insurance increases as a 
threat to property values, real estate markets, and local economies. Via YouTube, Twitter, 
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and Facebook, Kasimos urged homeowners to write and call their representatives in 
Congress, and to tweet politicians and journalists with the hashtags “#stopfemanow,” 
“#saveourhomes,” and “#fixflood.” The coincidence of Hurricane Sandy with the 
implementation of Biggert-Waters reopened questions about whether (or what) homeowners 
could or did “choose” and what homeowners in risky areas deserved when it came to 
managing the rising costs of flood risk under Biggert-Waters.  
In its efforts to make increasing insurance rates morally and politically indefensible, 
and to preserve the affordability of flood insurance, Stop FEMA Now articulated a set of 
NFIP implementation failures that, it argued, made meaningful choice over exposure to risk 
effectively nonexistent. The failures had chiefly to do with the way the NFIP maps and 
communicates risk, which both Stop FEMA Now and reformers agreed was a major 
weakness of the program. Stop FEMA Now did not argue that the flood risk facing an 
individual property could not be assessed scientifically. Rather, it argued that FEMA was bad 
at producing and communicating those scientific assessments; as a result, many homeowners 
did not and could not know their “true” flood risk, nor could actuarial premiums be 
established on a scientific basis. In the first place, many of the maps were long outdated and 
therefore inaccurate visualizations of current risk. Mapping flood risk takes considerable time 
and resources, which FEMA and the NFIP have had difficulty sustaining.46 For any given 
community, the many years that pass between reassessments compromise the basis of 
sensible zoning. When Sandy hit, most of the data underlying New York City’s maps, for 
instance, were from 1983.  
Stop FEMA Now urged homeowners to fight new maps on the grounds that they 
“overestimated” risk whenever possible. Even if maps were up to date, their scientific and 
technical accuracy could be contested, through FEMA’s formal appeals process, on the basis 
of competing and justifiable assumptions, data, and models. Stop FEMA Now argued that 
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homeowners would take responsibility for their individual risk but, because of the 
weaknesses in mapping, they could not trust that the risk was itself legitimately established. 
In the words of Queens, New York City activist with Stop FEMA Now: 
We’re not trying to say we shouldn’t look at risk, and we’re trying to dodge things 
here, but we want it to be accurate. And if you’re going to tell someone you’re going 
to lose a huge value on your house based on Biggert-Waters and maybe somebody 
won’t invest here, or maybe you got to raise your house for 100,000 dollars, we said 
to them, we don’t want it 99 percent correct. What you’re already telling us is, it’s not 
even 80 percent correct. We want 100 percent correct.47 
 
Stop FEMA Now also claimed that the NFIP had not communicated to subsidized 
policyholders that their rates did not in fact reflect their risk. Indeed, in the case of most 
subsidized properties, the “true risk” rate could not be estimated on the available data; FEMA 
did not have complete records of property elevations that would make such estimates 
possible.48 Because of these technical and communication failures, Stop FEMA Now argued, 
there had been no effective “signal” that would allow homeowners to exercise choice and 
control over their personal flood risk. In interviews, several officials who have audited the 
NFIP backed up this claim; as one of them put it, it is “not inconceivable that people have no 
idea what their risk actually is” and “people didn’t even know they were subsidized to begin 
with.”49  
Stop FEMA Now and its allies also worked to highlight histories of coastal and 
riverine development spurred by economic pressures for growth and facilitated by public 
officials and policymakers who deferred to developers. In December 2013, Columbia Law 
School convened a panel discussion called “Soaring Flood Insurance Rates: Should Congress 
Step In?,” gathering flood risk and insurance experts, New York City officials, and 
representatives from SmarterSafer. Kevin Boyle, a Rockaway, Queens, homeowner and 
editor of a local newspaper, was there to provide his firsthand experience of the changes. He 
referenced the question of risk and choice, with visible irritation:  
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The other thing is, we’ve been in the communities. . . . There was a compact, a 
promise somewhat; they encouraged coastal development. And I bought my house 
with flood insurance, and other people built the community with a subsidized program 
in place. It’s changing the game a little late for a lot of people.50  
 
To the extent that homeowners in the coastal areas of New York’s boroughs had chosen to 
live in high-risk areas, their choice was facilitated not only by flood insurance 
implementation problems, but also by the interests of powerful actors, inside and outside 
government, who encouraged real estate development (some of whom were now political 
allies of Stop FEMA Now). In the words of the president of the Broad Channel (Queens) 
Civic Association and a New York organizer with Stop FEMA Now: 
The government made a program, it was the stated policy of the United States 
government from ’68 on, is that [flood insurance] will be available, and it will be 
affordable. It wasn’t because oh, we want to help these people out. Maybe part of it is. 
It was because of the fact that all of these neighborhoods around here, back then, were 
looking, ‘Do we build around here?’ And of course the government’s always been 
building and creating these areas! And it’s been a huge tax return for the government 
in general, and for the American people.51 
 
In effect, these homeowners agreed with SmarterSafer and other supporters of Biggert-
Waters on this point, as well: the federal government had allowed or even encouraged 
habitation in areas that should perhaps never have been developed. As described above, 
FEMA had not ensured that local communities were complying with the land use 
requirements that were supposed to be a condition of accessing the NFIP, despite early and 
consistent warnings from the GAO and other experts.52 Communities were getting 
protection—and individuals were getting subsidies and grandfathered rates—but local 
officials were not actually restricting or regulating development in the flood zones and were 
thus putting more people and property at risk. In fact, over time, the federal government 
weakened the standards such that “by 1994 the Clinton administration simply required that 
‘positive attitudes’ with respect to floodplain management be ‘encouraged.’”53 But Stop 
FEMA Now drew a different conclusion from this history, arguing instead that the problem 
and its solution were to be found, not in the incentives facing insured individuals, but rather 
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in the collective failures and contradictions of public policy related to natural hazards and 
economic development.  
Stop FEMA Now had complicated the argument about past choices, asserting that 
homeowners were not to blame for the crisis facing the NFIP, their individual at-risk 
situations, or their troubles in the face of actuarial rating. They were indeed still victims—of 
policy failures and contradictions—deserving of sympathy and solidarity. By late in the  
summer of 2013, it was clear that the mobilization had the attention of the national media and 
of politicians. Senators Mary Landrieu (D-LA), David Vitter (R-LA), Robert Menendez (D-
NJ), and Charles Schumer (D-NY) vowed to address the concerns of Stop FEMA Now and 
reopened discussions of flood insurance in Congress. SmarterSafer and its allies had reason 
to worry about the longevity of their reform; they ramped up their media outreach to explain 
and justify Biggert-Waters. In their attempts to wrest control of the public perception of 
Biggert-Waters, the reformers—particularly environmentalists and scientists—continued to 
stress the importance of risk-based rating for the purposes of planning and individual decision 
making in the context of climate change.54 Though they acknowledged the existence of 
mapping errors, the general picture painted by the science was unambiguous; these were 
tough but nevertheless urgent and necessary changes, meant to make individuals more 
resilient. 
Defenders of Biggert-Waters confronted the “deservingness” of homeowners by 
turning to arguments about whom the shift to actuarial rating would really affect. There were 
“truly needy” policyholders, as experts had testified in congressional hearings, but in the 
wake of the backlash they called any retreat on NFIP reform a “beach house bailout.” 
Taxpayers were being asked to continue to support the owners of vacation homes and luxury 
condominiums. The president and chief economist of the Insurance Information Institute (III) 
argued that below-risk premiums were subsidizing millionaires: 
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I mean, it was subsidizing vacation homeowners, businesses, properties that have 
been repeatedly flooded. Is this a good use of taxpayer money in this time of 
austerity? Probably not. Does it make sense at all for people to be subsidizing for 
people to live on the beach? My answer to that is no. And I think, unless you’re one 
of the people who’s receiving that subsidy, the answer is generally no. . . . Why on 
earth should the federal government be providing subsidized coverage to millionaires 
to have a beach house? There’s no rationale for that.55 
 
The notion of the beach house bailout also steered the argument for reform out of the 
potential trap of entrenched sympathy for and solidarity with disaster victims. Biggert-
Waters’ implementation had coincided with Hurricane Sandy. In the national media, the 
optics of the backlash to Biggert-Waters centered on how its changes were affecting areas 
devastated by the storm, where Stop FEMA Now had its origins. Stories in the press showed 
families, standing in the wreckage of their homes, describing how even if they could rebuild, 
they might not be able to afford to insure and thus faced displacement. These were 
sympathetic figures: not only had they just suffered catastrophic loss, only to face a new 
source of financial strain, but they tended to be white and working- or middle-class families. 
A slow and complex process for settling claims after Sandy also made the NFIP appear 
insufficiently responsive to the plight of those who had paid in, attracting the ire of members 
of Congress.   
Defenders of Biggert-Waters argued that, despite the optics, these homeowners were 
not representative of who was really going to be affected by the changes to the NFIP. The 
NFIP needed reform because the majority of the people who were benefiting from a 
subsidized system could afford not to be subsidized. They did not deserve the sympathy of 
the public, or the support of taxpayers, because they could and should take responsibility for 
living on the water. One of the founders of the SmarterSafer coalition, a leader of a 
libertarian think tank, distinguished those who deserved sympathy from those who did not: 
First, the places that have been hit the hardest so far [by Biggert-Waters] are non-
primary residences—second homes—and severe repetitive loss properties that 
taxpayers have already rebuilt. The affordability issue? I don’t care, and I don’t think 
anybody else should, either. Nobody’s entitled to a second home, and almost nobody 
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is entitled to have the taxpayers rebuild their house more than once. . . . In the case of 
severe repetitive loss properties, there are a handful of people who are maybe old or 
long-term incumbent homeowners, who you do have to feel sorry for. . . .  Yes, there 
may well be pain to them. But I don’t understand how or why there’s a public 
responsibility to subsidize somebody to live in a particular house in a particular place. 
There’s some public responsibility to house people. People like to live near water. 
The houses facing the highest rates are the houses right near water, which are 
expensive. To me, there is an affordability issue, but it’s actually reasonably small.56 
 
A reformed NFIP would withdraw support from the undeserving wealthy: a group that was 
receiving an unneeded and unjust subsidy. The editorial board of the Wall Street Journal 
concurred, describing flood insurance as “a classic example of powerful government aiding 
the powerful, encouraging the affluent to build mansions near the shore,” in a December 
2013 editorial.57  
Stop FEMA Now argued instead that Biggert-Waters was affecting a population 
deserving of solidarity: ordinary, hardworking families, trying to hold onto a piece of the 
American dream through homeownership. They could not afford the increase in premiums; 
actuarial rates would force them out of their homes and devastate them economically. On 
September 28, 2013, three days before some of Biggert-Waters’ rate increases were to go into 
effect, protests took place across ten states, all under the banner of Stop FEMA Now. At the 
rally in Queens, New York, a resident of Hamilton Beach told the crowd that his 
neighborhood consisted of: 
mostly single family homes. Most of our residents have family ties to our community, 
having grown up there and later purchased their first homes there. The homes are 
modest but they are our homes. Homes that would become unaffordable if the flood 
insurance rates are allowed to skyrocket. Homes that would become virtually 
unsellable if the buyer is required to carry an outrageously high flood insurance 
premium.58  
 
In an open letter to Congress posted to Stop FEMA Now’s website in February 2014, a 
Rockaway organizer, a retired firefighter himself, wrote: 
Although some groups lead you to believe that all flood policyholders and people who 
live by the water are multimillionaires, nothing could be further from the truth. In 
reality we are police officers, firemen, teachers, nurses, sanitation men, and soldiers, 
also senior citizens and retirees greatly devastated by ruinous flood premiums. We are 
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also families who must live by the water for our livelihood: fishermen, oil workers, 
engineers, sailors, etc. We are people who have survived for years living in areas that 
have never been flooded. Now a manmade disaster—the Biggert-Waters Act—will 
destroy our neighborhoods, causing the unthinkable prospect that we will lose our 
homes.59  
 
The “man-made disaster” of Biggert-Waters would push out workers and families on the 
basis of risk assessments and insurance prices. NFIP policyholders deserved support and 
solidarity because actuarial rates would have unequal and economically catastrophic effects 
for the many policyholders who could not afford them. 
 In truth, property owners of highly varied resources were affected by Biggert-Waters. 
Luxury condominium developments and vacation homeowners have benefited from 
subsidized flood insurance, along with working-class communities.60 In the wake of Biggert-
Waters and Sandy, opposing sides of the reform issue staked a position as to whether NFIP 
policyholders deserved redress by foregrounding one group or the other. What emerged 
discursively from the contestation between the two was a notion of deservingness as 
determined around an axis of ability to pay for risk exposure—ability to take responsibility 
on the basis of risk and its price. Those who deserved sympathy and support were those who 
truly could not financially support their exposure to risk.  
Act III: Reforming the Reform 
In response to the controversy, in October 2013, Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA), whose name 
was on the original bill, organized a bipartisan congressional group to begin work on new 
flood insurance measures in the House and Senate. Her office issued a statement: “Neither 
Democrats nor Republicans envisioned [Biggert-Waters] would reap the kind of harm and 
heartache that may result from this law going into effect.”61 In March 2014, again with 
bipartisan support, Congress passed the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act 
(HFIAA). Kasimos, the founder of Stop FEMA Now, was invited to the signing. The terms of 
the HFIAA make further technical adjustments to the NFIP that reflect the arguments made 
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in the wake of Biggert-Waters. The HFIAA maintained Biggert-Waters’ resource 
commitment to flood risk assessment and mapping; the NFIP must produce up-to-date, 
accurate scientific information to rate insurance and to provide a sound basis for individual 
choices going forward. This reaffirmed personal exposure to flood risk as something 
individuals could and should play an active role in understanding and managing. The HFIAA 
also reinstated grandfathering. Homeowners would return to paying the rate they had been 
quoted at the time they purchased the policy—when they made a choice on the best or only 
information available to them at the time.  
Congress also addressed the issue of deservingness as it had been framed in the 
backlash to Biggert-Waters. The two sides had disputed whether at-risk homeowners 
deserved sympathy, the key contention being whether or not these homeowners could 
actually afford to pay actuarial insurance premiums: were they beach house millionaires or 
ordinary folks? With its new legislation, explicitly an “affordability act,” Congress indicated 
that the NFIP first needed to identify and institutionalize methods for telling the difference, 
and to define criteria for treating the two groups differently in order to avoid unduly harming 
homeowners when rates increased. The HFIAA did not repeal Biggert-Waters, but it did 
delay the most dramatic premium increases while FEMA completes its affordability study 
and produces a “framework.” Now, although homeowners could return to below-risk rates, 
they could expect their premiums to increase by as much as 18 percent every year, moving 
toward actuarial rates. The HFIAA makes it clear that any assistance should be offered in 
consideration of a policyholder’s income or wealth, providing “targeted assistance to flood 
insurance policyholders based on their financial ability to continue to participate in the 
National Flood Insurance Program.”62  
The next year, in March and December 2015, the study committee, convened by the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and comprising social scientists, flood experts, and 
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statisticians, released two reports to guide the design of an affordability framework. The 
fundamental question it had to answer was how the federal government might assess the 
affordability of premiums and policyholders’ ability to pay. As the committee pointed out, 
introducing an affordability framework would require the NFIP to collect and use new kinds 
of data on its policyholders: their income, wealth, and housing costs.63 In addition, the 
committee noted, introducing means testing to the NFIP for the first time would require 
further political decisions regarding eligibility: Who counts as “truly needy” of continued 
federal support in order to afford flood insurance? Whereas these kinds of distinctions are 
common in housing and public assistance, they represent a significant change in the 
particular context of natural hazards and disaster policy, where means tests and need-based 
considerations are not so familiar. After natural disasters, for instance, federal relief is 
damage-based, not income-based.64 In their first report, the NAS committee looks to other 
federal agencies and programs that use means tests, including HUD’s housing vouchers, the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program for potential methods of distinguishing eligibility and determining attendant 
support.65 Following the release of the NAS reports, a February 2016 GAO study determined 
that depending on the eligibility threshold used, 47–74 percent of subsidized policyholders 
would likely be eligible to receive some form of assistance.66 
Discussion 
The effort to reform the NFIP, to address its massive deficit and restore its fiscal stability, 
was waged as a debate about the fair terms of social interdependence. How should individual 
responsibility mitigate each policyholder’s contribution to the risk pool of the NFIP? Who 
gets to live how and where and at what cost to whom? Supporters of Biggert-Waters argued 
that flood risk was choice-sensitive,  since risk information is available, and that those 
affected by Biggert-Waters were affluent vacation homeowners who did not deserve 
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sympathy. The NFIP thus ought finally to adhere to its actuarial aims, underwriting risks 
more tightly so that individuals are responsible for the risks they bring to the pool and for 
understanding and managing the true cost of living in the floodplain. Opponents of Biggert-
Waters argued instead that homeowners had not been able to exercise choice over their risk 
exposure and that it was ordinary, hardworking Americans who would suffer under a fully 
actuarial regime. Flood insurance premiums thus needed to remain affordable, with 
reasonable contributions to the risk pool. The controversy surrounding Biggert-Waters 
arrived at a definition of deservingness around ability to pay for risk exposure: those who 
could afford their full-risk rates should pay them; those who could not should get some form 
of assistance. Subsidies were unwarranted and unjust, and should be withdrawn, if they were 
going to those who could afford to go without them. In other words, it now mattered who was 
receiving assistance and on what terms: rich and poor alike might face flood risk, and find 
themselves at some point under water, but deservingness of sympathy and support could not 
be assured on that basis alone.  
As discussed above, the deservingness of natural disaster victims has historically been 
premised on an understanding that their suffering is not the result of their own choices. In the 
flood insurance context, where floods are not treated as acts of God but rather as probabilistic 
risks, this is open to contestation and uneasily coexists with continued sympathy for 
victims—and the provision of disaster relief—once the flood eventually hits. In the 
controversy over Biggert-Waters, given the historical failures of the NFIP, it became difficult 
to assign blame for past choices. The ultimate outcome, however, enshrined choice on the 
basis of actuarial price signals as central to the governance of flood risk going forward. 
Defining deservingness around ability to pay for risk exposure makes the designation not 
about blame for the choice but about who can bear the costs of it. And as in other arenas of 
social policymaking, this definition undergirded the institutionalization of changes to natural 
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hazards policy: with its affordability framework, the NFIP is pursuing methods and criteria 
that will make such distinctions practically possible in the administration of flood insurance 
as it makes its actuarial shift. Contributions to the risk pool will be attenuated by a 
consideration of means, drawing a line internal to the program in order to adjust obligations 
to those who can and cannot afford to cover their personal exposure to risk.  
The incorporation of need-based considerations in the NFIP qualifies an 
individualization of responsibility for addressing the problem of flood loss. Given the hybrid 
public-private nature of the program, this individualization takes a particular form. The NFIP 
does not individualize responsibility by excluding people from the community of fate, 
leaving them completely on their own, as a truly private system might. Instead, it 
individualizes responsibility in two different but related senses. It makes all policyholders 
more accountable for their own risks through the programwide shift to risk-based premiums, 
as well as responsible for managing their own exposure to risk by modifying their consumer 
choices on that basis.67 Stop FEMA Now’s achievement, in the end, was to blunt the negative 
distributional effects of this individualization, through the commitment to provide assistance 
to those who cannot afford to be fully accountable for the risks they bring to the pool. This 
outcome protected those homeowners for whom the income shocks could be catastrophic and 
placated the protesters for the time being.  
Fundamentally, the core presumptions are that individuals are the source of risk and 
that greater individual responsibility on the part of those facing high risk, expressed as a form 
of market-based financial decision making, will most effectively manage our relationship to 
catastrophe. The faith in individual incentives remains, despite the evidence that a 
combination of factors has prevented them from working very well in practice, not least of 
which is policymakers’ aversion to acting on that faith. The legislation does toughen 
penalties on mortgage lenders who fail to enforce the mandatory purchase requirement and 
FORTHCOMING PUBLICATION 28 
provides resources to strengthen enforcement of land use regulations and building codes. 
These measures address important implementation failures, but it remains to be seen whether 
they can withstand the enduring pressure for local growth and development that have 
compromised such efforts in the past. Higher prices of insurance may well encourage—or 
force—some residents to relocate out of harm’s way, potentially taking huge losses on their 
most important assets, but the affluent may never be “priced out” of risky areas and more 
may even move in. As flood risks spread and worsen—as FEMA itself expects they will 
under further conditions of climate change—insuring them will require more and more of 
household budgets, with households having to find ways to manage the pressure on their 
finances. This will unfold in a broader context of risk shifts that have left American families 
providing more and more for their own security.68 For the time being, the program remains in 
debt, bringing in total premiums that will likely be insufficient to cover the next catastrophic 
flood event.69  
The affluent among subsidized NFIP policyholders may indeed be able to afford full-
risk costs and have been benefiting from a policy that, like many others of the American 
welfare state, inequitably, and often invisibly, enhances the position of the relatively well-off. 
Homeowners are a powerful political constituency and mobilize to defend their privileges 
when threatened.70 Stop FEMA Now’s priority was to fight off income shocks and threats to 
their property values, a set of immediate but rather limited interests that aligned them with 
some of the very actors who had helped put them at risk. Stop FEMA Now was not putting 
forth a vision of broad collective responsibility that would have, perhaps, led it to make 
common cause instead with renters and poor people who suffer worse from floods. After 
Sandy, public housing residents in the outer boroughs of New York City—neighbors of the 
activists in Stop FEMA Now—went without power or heat for weeks and, over four years 
later, over a dozen public housing sites are still using temporary boilers.71 Renters affected by 
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Sandy, more likely to be poor and people of color, reported increased rents, displacement 
from their pre-Sandy homes, overcrowding, and dangerous and unsanitary housing 
conditions.72 Flood insurance is itself a policy that helps only those who have something to 
lose, and these populations struggle to recover without the benefit of natural hazard and 
disaster policies that target homeowners. Yet in mounting their own reactive set of claims 
about choice and deservingness, the Stop FEMA Now homeowners laid open some of the 
public policy contradictions that left individuals responsible for managing risks that were 
collectively produced, imperfectly understood, and constantly changing.  
The re-reformed NFIP represents a tentative political resolution to the competing 
individualistic and solidaristic demands made on the program—tentative because it must be 
reauthorized every five years, when these arrangements can change again. It maintains the 
actuarial status of the NFIP, insuring natural hazard risk much like a private insurer in order 
to manage the incentives and responsibilities of individuals. However, it maintains its 
solidaristic commitment to providing guaranteed coverage and to keeping it within financial 
reach—no longer through subsidies based on risk, but through some new form of “targeted 
assistance” based on means. Some flood insurance experts have observed that true 
actuarialism and affordability in the NFIP, given its embattled history, may be economically 
and politically incompatible.73 In high-risk flood zones truly actuarial rates will be 
unaffordable for too many people, and every move in that direction has been and will be met 
with opposition, even as some communities face a future in which they will almost certainly 
be underwater. The case examined here shows that reconciling the two is, at a minimum, 
politically contentious.  
It may make more sense then to extend insurance solidarity, widening the pool of 
people who must buy into flood insurance to the 500-year floodplain or beyond, or even 
making it a mandatory part of all homeownership financing. After all, floods have never 
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stopped short at the borders of the official flood zones, beyond which disaster relief continues 
to compensate uninsured losses. Already, over 20 percent of flood insurance claims come 
from losses outside of currently mapped high-risk zones (where flood insurance is available 
but not mandatory).74 A FEMA-commissioned report on the future effects of climate change 
on the NFIP found high-risk flood zones increasing an average of 40–45 percent by the year 
2100.75 Rather than engage in political debates about what people in those zones did or ought 
to choose, we might instead see the coming floods, which we have scientific reason to believe 
will affect more and more people, as requiring—economically and morally—a broader 
sharing of the burdens and gains of social interdependence. Economically, extending the risk 
pool (which would also demand stronger enforcement of the mandatory purchase requirement 
than has historically existed) protects more people and brings more revenue into the program, 
helping the program cover the losses of the next flood and keeping it on firmer financial 
footing. Morally, it treats the coming disasters as a shared challenge, the costs of which we 
have a duty to share broadly—not because they are an act of God, but because no matter how 
much we know about the risk, no matter how precisely we can map and price it, collective 
failures both create flood risk and expose people to it. Some communities are already starting 
to see things this way, turning the financial pressure on individuals into a mandate to pursue 
collective flood security, in the form of mitigation projects and buyouts that provide 
resources for entire communities to retreat from risky waterfronts.76 The goal, ultimately, is 
to keep people safe in the face of those hazards, by combining insurance protection with 
stronger land use regulations and collective investments in rebuilding safer and smarter, 
higher up or further from the water’s edge.  
Conclusion  
Scientists have concluded that coastal flooding due to global warming has already begun.77 
Yet scholars, policymakers, and publics are only beginning to grasp the challenges climate 
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change poses to welfare states and how individuals and communities might be made more 
resilient to its worst effects. In some sense, climate change represents the kind of “exogenous 
shock” described by Esping-Andersen, putting immense new strain on the existing 
institutional configuration and revealing mismatches between policies and programs and the 
new and changing social (and natural) risks that citizens face.78 The experience of natural 
disasters has serious, long-term consequences for the economic well-being of individuals and 
communities. How the state distributes responsibility in this policy domain—who gets risk, 
who gets security, on what terms and at what cost—constitutes an important way in which 
the state provides for the welfare of its citizens. We ought to include within our analytical 
view the moral underpinnings of arguments for shifting the costs associated with natural 
disasters across the balance sheets of families and of the state, particularly as those disasters 
increase in frequency and severity.  
Whether flood insurance, disaster relief, and other forms of natural hazards and 
disaster policy can organize a social response that adequately protects citizens from an 
uncertain and changing hazard is an unsettled question. As the NFIP heads into its next 
reauthorization, much of the policy discussion has focused on potential privatization of the 
program. Private insurers now believe they have the technical capacity to underwrite flood 
risk and, with the NFIP moving in the direction of actuarial rating, will be able to compete on 
price. However, private insurers may skim off the low risks, leaving only the high risks to the 
state. That will compound the strain. And as other risks, currently privately underwritten, 
intensify under climate change (e.g., wind, wildfire), increasing insurance premiums may 
mean that more and more people cannot afford to buy their way into private networks of risk 
sharing. They too may be left to the state to handle, and a “splintering protectionism” 
generated in which increasing burdens are unequally felt by different citizens.79  
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